Value Prioritization and the NBA Draft, Part 1.
“With the 27th pick in the 2020 NBA Draft, the Utah Jazz select Udoka Azubuike, from Delta, Nigeria, and the University of Kansas.”
It’s November 18th, 2020, and the Utah Jazz are on the clock with 27th pick in the NBA Draft.
The Jazz are coming off a 44-28 campaign and a first round playoff exit after a 4-3 series defeat to the Denver Nuggets. Despite getting bounced early in the playoffs, there was reason for optimism. First off, they were missing a key contributor in Bojan Bogdanović. They also had their young star Donovan Mitchell go on a tear, playing the most impressive basketball of his career. Mitchell averaged 36.3 points per game on 52.9%/51.6%/94.8% shooting splits; he was otherworldly. These two factors had the Jazz in “win now” mode. The window for championship contention had been opened, and with another year of growth for Mitchell, combined with the return of Bogdanović and increased familiarity among the roster, expectations would be high.
It is fair to point out that most rookies do not contribute to winning basketball right out of the gate. For that reason, many teams looking to contend will try to send off their picks to a rebuilding squad in return for a veteran player. However, the Jazz decided not to do that; the man they wanted was still on the board.
Adam Silver approached the podium, and said, “With the 27th pick in the 2020 NBA Draft, the Utah Jazz select Udoka Azubuike, from Delta, Nigeria, and the University of Kansas.”
I was stunned.
The argument FOR drafting Azubuike was simple; the Jazz like to run a drop coverage defense, where the center hangs back near the rim. Azubuike is a drop coverage big, and could learn under the tutelage of their current starting center and (at the time) Two Time Defensive Player of the Year Rudy Gobert.
The argument AGAINST drafting Azubuike, however, was much stronger. Despite his success as a drop coverage center in college, there were real concerns about that success translating to the NBA. Azubuike is heavy on his feet and struggles out in space. That said, many big men struggle to guard in space, including Rudy Gobert, who has been played off the court when team go with smaller, faster lineups in the playoffs. So essentially, the Jazz were doubling down on a strategy that had failed them in the past, and not trying to bring in a secondary scheme. But wait, it gets worse! Azubuike had already played four years of college ball, so his upside was more limited than his other peers, giving him less time to fix his flaws before the clock runs out on him. He didn’t have the ability to create shots for himself, nor the passing or ball handling ability to create them for others. The most significant of his flaws, however? His career 41.6% free throw percentage during his time at Kansas.
The Azubuike pick was a total catastrophe to me. If you wanted to select him to give you immediate help, that fails on a few levels. He’s going to be sitting behind Gobert anyway, so in the playoffs, he’ll maybe see the court for 8 total minutes. In those 8 minutes, he’ll struggle even more mightily in the areas where teams pick apart Gobert anyway. He’s bringing nothing new or different to the table. If you want to say he was the pick to succeed Gobert in the future, that doesn’t make sense either. You’re in “win now” mode, and you’re already drafting for a time after your current core is done? That doesn’t make any sense. He’s also a player who had already played four years of college ball and didn’t project to grow much further. On top of that, Azubuike’s free throw shooting is so abysmal, and has been over such a large sample size, that you KNOW he is an unplayable liability at the end of games; a Hack-a-Shaq target the size of Texas. Lastly, and the primary reason this choice was so egregious, is that the center market in the NBA is the most heavily saturated of any position. There are tons of big men available who can play in a drop coverage in defense, and dunk the ball out of the roll on offense. It is one of the most easily replicated skillsets in the NBA, and often times, teams find good versions of these players on cheap contracts. This last season, Richaun Holmes and Nerlens Noel were prime examples, each earning around $5 million while being positive contributors.
To make matters worse, three players selected shortly afterward would have been much better fits. Desmond Bane out of TCU immediately stepped up for the Memphis Grizzlies this year with his shooting, and his strong frame allows him to play a stout brand of defense that the Jazz cannot get from any of their other guards. Jaden McDaniels was a dice roll by the Minnesota Timberwolves, but his long limbs and effort ended up making him the bright spot of an otherwise disastrous Minnesota Timberwolves defense. McDaniels also could have given them greater defensive flexibility against the small lineups that saw Gobert pushed to the bench. The same could be said for Xavier Tillman, a tough, sturdy big who also spent a few years in college, but is quicker than Azubuike, can guard smaller players, and has excellent passing vision for his size. Tillman went to the Grizzlies with the 35th pick. Instead, the Jazz punted on diversifying their roster and drafted someone with an easily replicable skill set who wasn’t ready to contribute this season. Azubuike played 57 minutes for the Jazz the entire year. Despite being the number one seed, the Jazz were eliminated in the second round of the playoffs, as their inability to adapt to smaller opposing lineups cost them. Another wing defender or a smaller big man who could fit a switching scheme may have swung the series.
The draft isn’t easy. No team has a perfect track record. Every year, people who have dedicated their entire lives to basketball and know much more about the game than I ever will, get fired because of mistakes they made in the draft. I will still argue, however, that the easiest way to screw up…is to fail to understand value. The Jazz wasted a valuable asset (a first round draft pick) on something they could have gotten on the cheap (a drop coverage center who dunks the ball, can’t shoot free throws, and can’t create offense); they paid a sports car price for a standard sedan. There’s nothing wrong with a standard sedan, but you don’t want to overpay for one.
Unfortunately for Udoka Azubuike, through no fault of his own, his selection was emblematic of many missteps that teams make. Still, I couldn’t be happier for Udoka Azubuike. Udoka grew up in Nigeria, where he says he often saw armed robberies and kidnapping during broad daylight. At age 10, he lost his father to illness. His mother, a middle school teacher, would face long stretches of time where she was not compensated for her labor. Azubuike saw a man shot dead for trying to steal food from a store. Soon after, things began to turn around for him, and he was discovered at a Basketball Without Borders camp. He relocated the United States, and earned a full ride scholarship to Kansas. While there, he became a First-Team All-Big 12 player, and was the leader of one of the best teams in the country. On top of that, he made the conference All-Academic team three times. I may criticize the pick, but I will never criticize the man, who has overcome multiple hardships more difficult than anything I’ve ever faced in order to earn his place. Organizations make mistakes, and players are human beings. It’s a shame that a person like Udoka Azubuike is often the one left to deal with the vitriol and resentment that was the result of an organizational error.
In Part 2, I will dig deeper into these concepts, and also expound upon areas of opportunity for teams to make the most of their picks. We’re going to get deep in the weeds, but remember: it’s just basketball. What Udoka Azubuike faced was real life. There’s a happy ending, though. When he signed his contract after being taken with the 27th pick, he was guaranteed $4 million over two years. The good guys always win in the end.